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“The opposition to a publically-financed higher education system is a political opposition to paying taxes rather 
than an attitude ineluctably derived from the mainstream of economic reasoning” (Vaizey, 1962, p. 36). 
Abstract 
The South African higher education student protests which began in October 2015 have culminated 
in the student body voicing increased demands for the implementation of free fee higher education. 
Key policy stakeholders and commentators have been critical of this demand stating that such a policy 
would be regressive and ‘destructive’ due to the fact that the rich dominate the student cohort, the 
net result of which would be the poor funding the higher education of the rich. There is a continued 
emphasis on the private benefits that higher education provides graduates, therbey necessitating 
tuition fees. This paper has shown that these arguments, dating back to the 1970s, have weak 
theoretical foundations. The view that the rich dominate the student cohort is questioned with the 
finding that only 18% of the households containing students are classified as rich. As the rich provide 
97% of personal income tax revenue and 76% of value added tax revenue it would be difficult for the 
poor to fund the rich. The states ‘chronic underfunding’ of the higher education system comes amid 
‘budgetary pressures’ highlighting the continued adherence of the state to fiscal austerity measures. 
These austerity measures have increasingly shifted the financial burden of higher education onto 
students. A financial burden that 80% of households are deemed to require financial assistance to 
meet. In reducing state funding to the higher education system, in real terms, the private benefits of 
higher education are used to lure students into paying ever increasing tuition fees, even taking on 
debt in order to do so. 
                                                          
1 http://www.zanews.co.za/cartoons/2015/10/22/feesmustfall-blade-plays-fiddle 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The South African (SA) student protests which began in October 2015 have cast a spotlight on the 
higher education (HE) system in the country. Grievances have been raised regarding the accessibility, 
affordability and state funding of HE. These concerns are a result of the increasing reliance on tuition 
fees as a key mechanism in funding HE. Frustrated by the lack of resources necessary to pay tuition 
fees, students made the demand for free fee HE to be implemented. This demand has resulted in the 
establishment of a commission to assess the current funding schemes and the admissibility of free fee 
HE in the country. The current debates and concerns around the funding of HE in SA echo a global 
trend. The funding of HE is a complex process with consideration of supply and demand, taxation, 
state budget allocation, the amount students are subsidised, access equality, funding allocations to 
colleges and technicons, the quality of education and living costs over and above tuition fees among 
some of the issues under consideration and debate. While key stakeholders and commentators in 
South African higher education suggest that fee free education would be regressive, in other words 
that wealth would be taken from the poor and redistributed to the rich, literature suggests that this 
claim may be unfounded. The research therefore sets out to investigate, in the South African context, 
the theoretical considerations which inform this view and the validity.  
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The literature review initially examines literature covering the marketisation of HE, the economic 
theories which justify tuition fees, the theory and ideology behind income contingent loan systems 
and an assessment of the primary literature informing the view that free fee HE is regressive. The 
focus then shifts to the South African context, the policy documentation informing tuition fees, the 
income contingent loan system and the prominent view that free fee HE is regressive. 
SECTION 1 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 The ‘state’ of Higher Education 
The student protests in SA echo a global movement against the dramatic rise in tuition fees. Protests 
have occurred in Germany, Kenya, Chile, the United States of America, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, England 
and Quebec (Moosa, 2016, n.p.). These student movements are “slowly emphasising the idea that HE 
is a public good to which all must have access, constituting a reversal of the privatisation trend onset 
by decades of neoliberal policies” (González & Pedraja, 2016, n.p.).  The policies informing the funding 
of HE began shifting dramatically in the 1970s2, coinciding with the rise of neoliberalism, a doctrine 
synonymous with reduced tax rates and the reduction of state spending in favour of a balanced 
budgets (Chang, 2003; de Rivero, 2001). Fine (2012) describes the adoption of neoliberal policies 
resulting in large scale privatisation and the implementation of user fees for health and education as 
conditions set by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in exchange for loans. 
“Governments internalised the logic underpinning user fees” (Fine, 2012, p.6), a logic of cost sharing 
relying on the distinction between the private and social benefits goods and services provide (Fine & 
Jomo, 2006). This resulted in a wave of financialisation, a process whereby the barriers to financial 
markets are removed and finance grows to dominate the economic lives and activities of a country 
and its citizens (Painceira, 2009). 
1.2 Toward greater marketisation 
Tilak (2004) notes that, globally, HE systems began shifting from models reflecting a public good 
(conventional system) to a tuition fee market-based model (emerging system). In countries where HE 
was free fees were introduced and where fees already existed, they were increased. To compensate 
for the lack of affordability of tuition fees student loans were introduced, as explained by the process 
of financialisation. Table 1 summarises this shift in HE systems. 
 
                                                          
2 For a detailed account of the evolution of global HE funding see Woodhall (2007) 
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Table 1: The marketisation of HE 
Conventional System Emerging System 
Welfare Approach Market Approach 
Public HE Mixed and Private HE 
Public Financing Private Financing 
Private: State Financed Institutions Private: Self Financing Institutions 
Private: State recognised Institutions Private Institutions requiring no state recognition 
Private: Degree awarding Institutions Private: Non-Degree (Diploma/ Certificate) awarding 
Institutions 
Private: Philanthropy and educations 
considerations 
Private: commercial motives; profit motives 
No Fees Introduction of Fees 
Low Levels of Fees High Levels of Fees 
No Student Loans Introduction of Student Loan Programmes 
Commercially Ineffective Loan Programmes –  no 
security 
High default rates based on criteria of educational 
qualifications and economic needs 
Effective/Commercially Viable Loan Programmes: 
security/mortgage 
Expected high recovery rates based more commercial 
considerations 
Emphasis on Formal/Full-Time Education Open/Distance/Part-Time Education 
Selection criteria for Heads of Institutions: 
Academic background 
Selection criteria for Heads of Institutions: Expertise 
in Financial/ Money Management; and in Resource 
Generation 
Source: Tilak, 2004 
Tuition fees were introduced or increased because it is believed that HE provides greater private 
benefits to graduates then social benefits to the public at large and as such the costs should be shared 
between the state and students. In this context the private benefits referred to are the increased 
employability and greater income earning potential of graduates as opposed to non-graduates. The 
foundation of this belief is human capital theory (HCT). 
1.3 Human Capital Theory – The neoliberal justification of fees 
Schultz (1961) hypothesised that greater levels of educational attainment resulted in a greater 
productive capacity of labour. Education, or ‘human capital’, was thus given relevance to the 
production function. Investments in ‘human capital’ would therefore increase both the quantity and 
quality of production, this the basic premise of HCT. Schultz (1961) demonstrated that differences in 
educational attainment among labourers served to explain observed differences in the income earned 
by labourers, such that higher levels of education resulted in higher wages earned. Psacharopoulos 
(2006) and Becker (1962) argue that public investment in primary and secondary education is 
necessary, however, due to the fact that HE provides graduates with significant advantages in the 
labour market which are derived in private capacity, public subsidies to HE are discouraged. 
Despite this, Schultz (1961) emphasises the unequal distribution of income earnings highlighting the 
importance of investment in education, particularly for lower income earners. There are, however, 
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contradictions regarding the source of this investment, with Schultz initially stating the need for public 
and private loans before discussing state funding which, 
 … turns on ideas about welfare, the goal is to reduce the unequal distribution of personal 
income among individuals and families. Our community has relied heavily on progressive 
taxation and inheritance taxation. Given public revenue from these sources, it may well be 
true that public investment in human capital, is an effective and efficient set of expenditures 
for attaining this goal (Schultz, 1961, p.15). 
HCT gained popularity with continued development by Schultz (1963), Becker (1964) and later Mincer 
(1989). Samoff and Caroll (2003, p.3) state that the direct link between economic growth and 
education demonstrated by HCT captured the attention of the World Bank as existing models failed 
to explain economic growth, comprehensively. With education in the spotlight, the World Bank set up 
its own education department in the late 1960s (Heyneman, 2003) and began influencing policy 
narratives (Fine & Jomo, 2006). This led to policy and funding guidelines being published by the Bank, 
one of which recommending that HE be fully privately funded (Heyneman, 2003). Despite the concerns 
of Schultz (1962) regarding inequality and the source of funding for investment in HE, there was a 
clear drive by the World Bank to promote private financing of HE, what Heyneman (2003) refers to as 
the World Banks ‘short policy menu’. Psacharopoulos (2006) and Becker (1962) argue that public 
investment in primary and secondary education is necessary, however, due to the fact that HE 
provides graduates with significant advantages in the labour market which are derived in a private 
capacity, public subsidies to HE are discouraged.  
1.4 The ‘immeasurable’ benefits of HE 
Together with the aforementioned HCT, the second component in justifying the global increase in 
tuition fees was the distinction between the public and private benefits derived by HE students. Using 
rate of return analysis Psacharopoulos (1972; 1981 & 1994) of the World Bank showed that, in both 
developing and developed countries, it made ‘economic sense’ to invest more public funds in primary 
and secondary education and to share the costs of HE because the benefits students derive are largely 
private. The different benefits created by HE are shown in Table 2, which demonstrates that the 
benefits of HE are not mutually exclusive rather complimentary, often overlapping making their 
individual assessment inaccurate.  
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Table 2: The benefits of HE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Merisotis, 1999) 
The distinction between benefits is questionable given that social benefits were largely omitted from 
the rate of return analyses calculated due to the inherent difficulty in measurement. McMahon (2009) 
describes how the ‘difficulty and lack of understanding’ in measuring the social benefits created an 
exclusive focus on private benefits, resulting in the continued policy narrative of cost sharing between 
the state and students. The difficulty in quantifying the social benefits of HE does not eliminate their 
existence, what Merisotis (1998) elaborately terms the ‘chasm’ of understanding the wide array of 
benefits attributed to HE by both the public and policy makers. Merisotis (1999) demonstrated that 
the private benefits of HE also create social spill overs. If graduates earn higher wages they will in turn 
increase the state’s tax revenue. The greater employability of graduates also results in greater 
productivity, a conclusion conforming to HCT. 
Having assessed the pattern of HE funding and the economic theory informing the funding of HE, the 
next section elaborates on and examines the primary literature which informs the view that free fee 
HE is regressive. 
1.5 The simple supply and demand argument 
With fees either being introduced or rising, Psacharopoulos (1977) provided a seminal piece on HE 
funding and access equality, whose conclusion continues to influence policy narratives today. 
Psacharopoulos argues that free fee or heavily subsidised HE would be regressive because non-price 
selection criteria, such as access tests, for university positions benefit the rich. This is due to the fact 
that applicants from higher social classes have access to greater resources and are thus able to 
perform better in access tests, resulting in a student cohort dominated by the said social classes. In 
 Private Social 
Economic 
Higher salaries Increased tax revenues 
Greater chances of employment Greater Productivity 
Improved working conditions Increased consumption 
Personal and professional mobility Increased workforce flexibility 
  Decreased reliance on state support 
Non-
economic 
Improved health and life expectancy Reduced crime rates 
Improved quality of life for offspring Increased charitable giving and 
community service 
Better consumption making decisions Greater social cohesion and appreciation 
of diversity 
Increased personal status Improved ability to adapt to and use 
technology 
More hobbies and leisure activities   
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SA, the grade 12 final examinations can be considered as the ‘access test’ which determines university 
eligibility since university specific admissions tests are not used as the main entrance criteria.  
Psacharopoulos (1977) used the following formulae to assess HE funding in 62 countries (excluding 
SA), 42 of which with per income capita lower than $1000 and 22 with per capita income above $1000.  
(1) 𝑟
𝑢= 
𝑌3 − 𝑌2
3(𝐶3 + 𝑌2)
                   (2) 𝑟
𝑠= 
𝑌3 − 𝑌2
3(𝑌2)
                (3) ∆= 𝐷3−S3                 (4) (
𝐶3
𝑌2
) 
(5)
√∑ (𝑆𝑖 − 𝑆)
2
𝑖
3
𝑆
⁄
                 
 
Where 𝑌3 = average annual income of a graduate, 𝑌2= average annual income of a non-graduate, 
𝐶3 =the full cost of study HE studies per year, 𝐷3 = demand for HE positions and 𝑆3 = relatively fixed 
supply of positions in HE.  Equation (1) represents the rate of return  𝑟𝑢  of HE when it is not heavily or 
completely subsidised. Equation (2) formulates the rate of return 𝑟𝑠  of HE when it is completely 
subsidised. Equation (3) demonstrates the supply and demand of positions in HE institutions. Supply 
is considered to be fixed in the short term while demand is based on the rate of return of HE against 
the rate of return provided by the best alternative. Equation (4) represents the subsidisation index, 
“that is the higher the direct social cost of education relative to foregone earnings, the higher the 
effective government subsidy when HE is provided free of charge” (Psacharopoulos, 1977, p.79). The 
final equation (5) quantifies what Psacharopoulos (1977) terms the educational inequality index. This 
index captured the “dispersion of enrolments by school level” (Psacharopoulos, 1977, p.82). 
These equations are used to demonstrate that free fee or heavily subsidised HE has ‘perverse effects’ 
on access equality through a simple supply and demand argument.  Logically, as state subsidisation to 
HE increases the rate of return derived from a HE qualification increases, 𝑟𝑠 > 𝑟𝑢, thus the demand for 
HE, 𝐷3 , increases. In calculating the subsidisation index (equation 4) Psacharopoulos indicates a lack 
of available data on the income earned by non-graduates,𝑌2, thereby substituting this with national 
per capita income figures. This would create inaccuracies because, as indicated by HCT, graduates earn 
significantly more than non-graduates, thus by using an average income figure, graduate earnings are 
included, resulting in an average higher than that which would be obtained from non-graduates 
exclusively. 
The influence of this model and other rate of return analyses by Psacharopoulos (1972; 1981 & 1994) 
greatly influenced HE funding policies (Heyneman, 2003 and Samoff and Carol, 2003) toward greater 
cost sharing, considering this next section looks at the shortcomings of this model as well as the 
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simplifications made by Psacharopoulos in using this rate of return analysis to determine that public 
subsidies toward HE are regressive. 
1.5.1 All else equal  
Psacharopoulos (1977) uses social classes in stating that free fee HE is regressive, however, no 
definitions are provide for these social classes. Without definitions, representative conclusions cannot 
be made, given that the distribution of these classes would differ in each of the countries assessed.  
Psacharopoulos fails to account for the social benefits indicated in Table 2 and by Merisotis (1999), 
continuing the focus on private benefits as discussed in section 1.4. The effects of progressive personal 
income taxation (PPIT), through which the higher the ‘private benefits’ of graduates the greater the 
tax revenue of the state, are also omitted. Taxation is a key component of this debate, Trostel (2010) 
found, in the United States of America (USA) that lifetime fiscal expenditures on graduates are much 
lower than non-graduates, with the former contributing much more in taxation. Trostel concludes that 
if producing more qualified tax payers was the only benefit of HE investment, it would still be a ‘sound’ 
public investment due to the amount of tax HE graduates contribute to the state revenue. Johnson 
(2006, p.1 & p.3) assessed public subsidies to HE in the USA, concluding that “although youths from 
high income families obtain more benefit from HE subsidies, high income households pay sufficiently 
more in taxes that the net effect of the spending and associated taxation is distributionally neutral or 
mildly progressive…low income households receive positive net benefits while very high income 
households receive negative net benefits”. 
Psacharopoulos (1977, p.78) states that these additional elements have been omitted from the 
equations “for simplicity… as they do not affect the points made” and that “part of the unsatisfied 
demand for HE is due to factors outside state control, these include market conditions for graduates 
and wage structures” (1977, p.81). The excluded factors have an effect on an individual’s class, they 
cannot be discarded for simplicity. Potential students from lower social classes may not even apply to 
HE because of financial constraints, a consideration which those in higher social classes do not face, a 
point demonstrated by Kane (1995). Therefore the opportunity cost of not attending HE is not 
ubiquitous, as suggested. 
Psacharopoulos (1977) concludes that free fee HE will create an excess demand against the ‘relatively 
fixed’ supply of HE positions. Curiously, Psacharopoulos (1980, 1981 & 1993) advocated redirecting 
state funding from HE to primary education. If states redirect their funds to lower levels of education 
and impose progressively higher tuition fees for HE, the long-term demand for HE would increase 
because of the expansion of basic education while the tuition fees imposed will create a greater 
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financial barrier to HE for those in lower social classes, essentially pricing them out of the market. 
Manski & Wise (1983) and Gladieux & Hauptman (1995) illustrate this point, finding that lower income 
students are more sensitive to higher fees than higher income students. 
Ram (1982) found that when expanding these formulae, to account for public subsidisation at each 
level of schooling and the distribution of income within a country the ‘perverse effects of regressivity’ 
found by Psacharopoulos fall away, especially in low income countries. In order to conclusively state 
the free fee HE is regressive the class dynamics of the student cohort need to be considered, 
supplemented by the tax distribution which is critical as Mishan (1969) demonstrated in finding that 
the higher contributions of graduates to the tax pool result in HE ‘paying for itself’.  
The next section assesses the validity of the model presented by Psacharopoulos (1977) within the 
context of SA. 
1.6 The inequality of choice 
In SA, the unemployment rate (and the rate including discouraged job seekers) among those who have 
only completed primary school was 29.6% (41.5%), for those who had completed matric it was 25.8% 
(33.21%) and for HE graduates it was only 9.6% (11.55%)3. Without consideration given to the 
difference in employment opportunities between graduates and non-graduates the choice to enter 
HE is reduced to a pure business transaction in which the potential gain in income (private benefits) is 
the sole determinant of the demand for HE. Considering the variability in employment rates presented 
it would be overly optimistic to assume that every South African understands their labour 
opportunities and the income they would earn based on their decision to enter the labour market or 
attend HE. 
In 2012 the Department of Higher Education and training (DHET, 2012) stated in 2007 there were 98 
000 individuals, aged between 18 and 24, who met university entrance criteria but could not attend 
HE or find employment. The equations presented in section 1.3 do not account for such a scenario.  A 
long-term study tracking the progression of the 2008 South African grade 12 cohort (van Broekhuizen, 
van der Berg, and Hofmeyr, 2016) reveals that those from more affluent schools are more likely to 
achieve entrance to HE, as argued by Psacharopoulos (1977). However, the study also concluded that 
about one third of all matriculants who meet the entrance criteria of HE did not enter a HE institution. 
While no indication is given why, they may form part of the 98 000 who cannot afford HE or find 
employment. 
                                                          
3 Authors calculations using Census 2011 data, these figures are for those 18 years and older 
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The model proposed by Psacharopoulos (1977) is static and do not account for HE inflation, a 
particular concern in SA. The cost of HE increases, on average, 2% per annum higher than consumer 
price inflation rate (CPI)4. Only those who can afford HE are free to opt between HE and their next 
best alternative. This inequality of choice is made particularly evident by Orthofer (2016) who found 
that when taking assets into consideration 10% of the South African population own between 90% 
and 95% of accumulated wealth, while the same group ‘only’ earns between 55% and 60% of the 
country’s income.  Those who cannot afford HE simply lack the resources and finances to opt for an 
outcome with similar rates of return5. 
In suggesting that public funds are better suited to primary and secondary education, the World Banks 
influence resulted in donor aid to HE being reduced, as a result developing countries had a reduced 
ability to finance their HE systems which resulted in the greater tuition fees, and the introduction of 
loan systems to provide access to those unable to afford tuition fees (Woodhall, 2007 p.20). Despite 
the concerns mentioned in this section as well as literature providing contrary findings the movement 
toward cost sharing, and income contingent loan systems to expand access continued, as Barr (1991, 
2003) and Chapman (1997, 2005) assisted countries, both developing and developed in the setting up 
of student loan systems (Woodhall, 2007). 
Perhaps the best critique of Psacharopoulos and the World Banks work in HE, ironically originates from 
from the World Bank itself, pointing out the lack of depth in the economic theories behinds HE funding, 
 “… Economic arguments are based on a limited understanding of what HE institutions 
contribute. Rate of return studies treat graduates as valuable only through their income and 
the greater tax revenues extracted by society. Graduates clearly have many other effects on 
society, they are well placed to be economic and social entrepreneurs, having a far-reaching 
impact on the economic and social well-being of communities. They are vital to creating an 
environment in which economic development is possible. Finally, rate-of-return analysis 
entirely misses the impact of university-based research on the economy – a far-reaching social 
benefit that is at the heart of any argument for developing strong higher education systems” 
(Task Force on Higher Education, 2000). 
Having assesse the macro trends in HE funding, focus is now shifted to the South African context, 
which in many areas mirrors the discussion thus far. 
                                                          
4 This is based on the South African Higher Education Price Index, accessed at: http://www.usaf.ac.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/HEPI-project-report-Executive-summary.pdf 
5 Branson, Garlick, Lam & Leibbrandt (2012) detail the inequality and unemployment present in SA despite the 
high primary and secondary school attainment rates.  
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1.7 Higher Education Funding in South Africa 
Maassen and Cloete (2006) note the rise of neoliberal ideologies in the 1980s, with which came the 
‘acceptance’ of the increased marketisation of HE. This saw it being viewed as a mixture between a 
public and a private good. The SAPSE model advocated tuition fees on this basis (Bunting, 2006), 
echoing the theoretical perspectives of HCT and the World Bank, discussed in section 1.2 and 1.3. 
Bunting (2006) highlights how the Apartheid government reduced funding, in real terms, to the HE 
while simultaneously increasing tuition fees, mimicking global trends (Maassen & Cloete, 2006). The 
importance of tuition fees as an income stream for the funding of HE systems was growing. 
In the first post-Apartheid White Paper on education, there is a clear reflection of theory discussed in 
the previous sections. 
 
Fee-free HE for students is not an affordable or sustainable for SA. The knowledge and skills 
acquired in achieving HE qualifications generate significant lifetime private benefits as well as 
long-range social benefits for the public at large. Although HE institutions admit an 
increasingly large proportion of students from poor families, students from middle-class and 
wealthy families still tend to be disproportionately well-represented. For these reasons, the 
costs of HE should be shared equitably between public and private beneficiaries (DoE, 1997, 
p.40). 
The pre and post-1994 government narrative pertaining to the funding of HE did not deviate very 
much and reflect the findings of Psacharopoulos (1973, 1977 & 1981) and later Chapman (1997, 2001) 
and Barr (2003, 2004). All of whom advocate cost sharing and the use of income contingent loan 
systems to increase the accessibility of HE, which will be discussed in the next section.  
1.8 Loans to expand access 
In SA, the National Students Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) was developed to prevent financial 
exclusion from HE, allowing greater accessibility. As detailed on the official website6, NSFAS provides 
loans to students at 80% of the Reserve Bank Repurchase rate with the maximum value of a loan being 
R71 800 per annum. Loans are repaid once a student has graduated and earns a steady income of, at 
least, R30 000 per annum. Repayments range from 3% to 8% of annual income paid in monthly 
installments. In 2011 NSFAS provided finances to 31% of the entire undergraduate cohort (Simkins, 
2016, p.53). In light of the student protests the social classes used to assess the eligibility of applicants 
for financial assistance has been expanded to those shown in Table 3. 
                                                          
6 These details were found at http://www.nsfas.org.za/content/studentsupport.html 
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Table 3 – ISFAP funding categories 
            
 
  
Source: DHET, 2016 
 
The DHET (2012, p.ix) states that “SA does not have an official singular definition of the poor, with 
different departments using different definitions”. Visagie and Posel (2013) highlight the lack of a clear 
definition of the middle class in SA. Without universal definitions, the argument stating that the middle 
and rich classes dominate the student cohort becomes an exercise of definitions. Collaborative policy 
discussion and analysis would be difficult to achieve without formally accepted definitions 
 
The second White Paper (DHET, 2013) and NSFAS 2014 Annual Report (NSFAS, 2015) make clear 
indications of affordability concerns regarding HE costs and the need to financially accommodate a 
greater audience. Within the National Development Plan (NDP) the state also acknowledges the need 
to create greater access to HE, highlighting South Africa’s poor HE participation rate7 with respect to 
comparable middle-income countries. The NDP sets the target of increasing the HE participation rate 
to 30% by 2030 (NDP, 2011) advocating NSFAS as the vehicle with which to expand access. In order to 
nearly double the participation rate in 19 years, significant increases would be necessary in funding 
the system, which has not been the case. Despite recognising the ‘chronic underfunding’ of the system 
(DHET, 2014) and the affordability constraints of potential students, tuition fees continued to rise 
above CPI. 
1.9 ‘Taking money from the poor to subsidise the rich’  
With the inability of NSFAS to assist all those who are financially excluded from accessing HE and the 
affordability concerns of the middle class, students began protesting. Although not part of the original 
protest, student bodies eventually began demanding the implementation of free fee HE. In response, 
there has been a continual emphasis that such a policy would be regressive (Cloete, 2016 & Archer, 
2015). The minister, deputy minister and the director of HE policy at the DHET (Carlisle, 2016; Manana, 
2016 & Nicolson, 2016) are among those who expressed this view.  In reaction to the student protests 
and an increased media focus, the DHET stated that “a wealth of evidence supports the fact that free 
HE systems tend to be regressive, redistributing wealth from the poor to the rich” (DHET, 2015, p.4). 
The Minister of HE stating that “it would be taking money from the poor to subsidise the rich" (Shange, 
                                                          
7 The participation rate is the percentage of a population group aged between 20 and 24 who attended a 
higher education institution. The NDP claims a participation rate of 17% (p.273) 
Social class: Household income per annum 
Very Poor to Poor R0 – R150 000 
Middle Class R150 001 - R300 000 
Rich R600 000+ 
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2015, n.p.). Despite these claims no evidence is provided, however, the narrative outlined by 
Psacharopolous (1977) is clearly evident. 
 
It is worth considering that some students do not even apply to HE due to financial constraints.  
Ironically the DHET (2012, p.ix) highlights this point, “NSFAS funding is insufficient to meet demand, 
widespread poverty in SA, coupled with very high unemployment especially amongst the youth, 
affecting both financial and epistemic access to university”. This statement contradicts the views 
expressed above and despite research concluding that, provided a PPIT system, free fee HE is not 
necessarily regressive, the view persists among key stakeholders in the HE sector. Evidence also exists 
which suggests that theory behind the narrative that free fee HE is regressive is unfounded, 
particularly given the social class dynamics of South Africa and its HE student cohort. As previously 
stated, the DHET (2012) highlighted that financial exclusion, despite meeting the criteria for entry is 
prevalent in SA. Given this evidence an investigation into the narrative, among key stakeholders, which 
states that free fee HE is regressive will provide an important view into the elements which inform HE 
policy and the considerations of key stakeholders regarding HE funding. 
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1.10 Research Questions 
The primary focus of this research is to investigate the underlying narrative and evidence supporting 
the widespread view stating that free fee HE in SA would be regressive. In order to achieve this it will 
be necessary to conduct interviews at the key intuitions which formulate HE policy and funding. The 
aim was to supplement these interviews with student data. This approach has been adapted due to 
limitations on the availability and accessibility of data regarding applications for HE as well as 
applications for financial assistance to access HE. 
 
             Sub questions 
 
1. What is the theoretical basis for the continued reliance on income contingent loans? 
It has been shown that SA has become increasingly reliant on the loan system to create greater 
access to HE since its inception, this while the sates contribution to HE funding has decreased. 
This research will assess this reliance, despite the states acknowledgement that there are 
limitations to the current system.  
 
2. What is the prevalence of the social classes of South Africa within the student cohort? 
A key consideration of the debates surrounding the funding of HE requires a class analysis of 
the HE student cohort against the greater SA population is presented in order to ascertain the 
relative over or under representation of classes within the student cohort. This can be used 
to validate the statements and policy narratives outlined in section 1. 
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SECTION 2 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Section 2 will discuss, in more detail, the mixed methodology used to answer the questions outlined 
in section 1.11. 
2.1 Assessing the policy narrative 
A purposive sampling strategy was used to identify key stakeholders, in authoritative positions at the 
DHET, National Treasury, NSFAS and the Council on Higher Education, all of which formulate and 
advise on HE policy and/or funding8. A total of 6 key stakeholders were interviewed, using semi- 
structured interviews. Given the sensitivity of this research the identity of the key stakeholders will 
not be disclosed. Interviewing these key stakeholders allowed for a comprehensive assessment of the 
presiding policy narrative and its theoretical basis to be assessed. Semi-structured interviews were 
chosen due to their comparability and flexibility, with additional questions asked when the need arose.  
Interview questions were informed by the literature review and material which surfaced because of 
the commission of inquiry into HE and training. The core questions used in the semi-structured 
interviews are provided in the appendix (A1). 
2.2 Creating a class based cohort 
Census 2011 data was used to assess the national household income distribution and that of 
households containing HE students. The feasibility of using more recent data from the General 
Household Survey was assessed, however, the income data was found to be erratic with far fewer 
income bands than those present in the Census data set9. In creating these distributions all responses 
where personal or household income was “unspecified” were removed from the data, thus the tables 
and charts based on the authors calculations presented in section 3 were calculated using ‘cleaned’ 
base sizes. All analysis conducted was based only on students attending public universities.  
The original aim was to supplement the student cohort created from Census 2011 with data from HE 
loan suppliers to assess who is financially excluded from HE. Unfortunately, this data was not provided 
by suppliers, despite originally agreeing to do so. None-the-less research by state institutions, in light 
of the aforementioned commission of inquiry, have been used to supplement this research. These 
include key contributions concerning the affordability of HE, the tax burden across the social classes 
in SA and the class dynamics of the HE student cohort. This combination supplements the descriptive 
                                                          
8 It must be stated that key stakeholders stressed that the views expressed are personal and do not reflect the 
views of these institutions as a whole. 
9 All data sets, whether used in the results section or found to be inadequate for the purposes of this study, 
were obtained from: https://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za, The 10% sample Census 2011 data set was used. 
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statistics created, allowing for a more well founded analysis, especially given the lack of data 
availability.  
2.3 Limitations 
Ageing Data: 
A study of this nature is very much dependent on the quality of data available. While Census 2011 
proved to be the most applicable dataset, it is 6 years old, which given the changes to the HE sector 
in that time, renders it as somewhat dated. At the time of the analysis the 2016 community survey 
data was not made available. 
Limited availability of meaningful data: 
Income data is also known to be unreliable. However, given the secrecy of financial institutions and 
the inability of state institutions to provide the data requested, Census 2011 again proved the most 
applicable. The household income figures in the Census dataset are also derived and are therefore not 
exact. Statistics South Africa obtains the household income figures10 by summing the income of all 
individuals living within the same household. The income of individuals is asked using intervals not 
exact amounts, therefore, in order to calculate household income each individual in the household 
had to be assigned a specific income relative to their earnings. These amounts are shown in the proxy 
variables column below. Using proxy variables to derive household income would potentially 
compound the issue of already unreliable income data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Statistics South Africa provides explanations of all the variables in its metadata publication, available at: 
https://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/dataportal/index.php/catalog/485/download/8285 
Income Categories: Proxy Values: 
No income 0 
R 1 - R 4 800 R 3 200 
R 4 801 - R 9 600 R 7 200 
R 9 601 - R 19 200 R 13 576 
R 19 201 - R 38 400 R 27 153 
R 38 401 - R 76 800 R 54 306 
R 76 801 - R 153 600 R 108 612 
R 153 601 - R 307 200 R 217 223 
R 307 201 - R 614 400 R 434 446 
R 614 401- R 1 228 800 R 868 893 
R 1 228 801 - R 2 457 600 R 1 737 786 
R2 457 601 or more R 4 915 200 
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Although the class demographics of the student cohort will be assessed, the data available provides 
little detail on the method used by students to pay their tuition fees, which would allow for a more 
thorough analysis.  The data available only allows for surface level arguments to be made, which in 
this case is sufficient. 
There is also no data which measures the reasons why those who apply for and receive the results 
necessary to enter HE do not do so. This is vital considering that just over a third of the 2008 
matriculants who qualified for HE did not attend, even up to six years after matriculating (van 
Broekhuizen, van der Berg, and Hofmeyr, 2016). 
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SECTION 3 – FINDINGS 
This section combines insights from census data analysis, state research and the interviews with key 
stakeholders highlighting the key findings. 
 
3.1 The narrative of free fee HE as regressive in the SA context 
 
• All of the key stakeholders were unanimous in the opinion that free fee higher education 
would be regressive. This is because the rich dominate the student cohort and as a 
consequence of this, the poor would be funding the higher education of the rich.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of annual household income (2011) 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the national distribution of annual household income vis-à-vis the distribution of 
annual household income for the households containing HE students, based on the standard income 
categories found in the Census 2011 dataset. Figure 1 demonstrates that from the annual household 
income category of R76 801 to R153 600 per annum, each subsequent income category is over-
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represented when comparing the national household income distribution to the distribution of 
household income for households with HE students. The income categories used in the Census dataset 
utilise different income categories as compared to those shown in Table 4, which are to be used by 
ISFAP. The ISFAP model, proposed in the latter half of 2016, declared that students from households 
earning an annual income lower than R600 000 per annum would qualify for financial assistance based 
on a sliding scale, where financial assistance is provided in the form of both loans and grants or a 
combination of the two. This combination would depend on the financial well-being of the households 
from which applicants come.  
Table 4: The ISFAP funding scheme 
 
Source: Key Stakeholder three and four. The expanded income brackets shown above are not found in (DHET, 2016) 
 
All but one of the key stakeholders agreed that these income brackets were good representations of 
the social classes in SA. Key stakeholder two stressed the need to expand on the ‘very poor’11 category 
from its current definition of R0 to R150 000 to R0 to R300 000 per annum on the basis of the added 
financial pressures facing previously disadvantaged citizens, the high dependency ratios found in 
poorer households and the general economic difficulties in the country. 
 
The Census dataset used for this research is from 2011 while the income categories in Table 4 are at 
2016 prices as such the income categories were adjusted downward to account for the inflation 
experienced between 2012 and 201612 to provide the income categories shown in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 The latest ISFAP model expands on the NSFAS class definitions by splitting the lowest class into very poor 
and poor, although the income bands associated with these expanded class definitions are not found in the 
official ISFAP report (DHET, 2016) they were provided by Key Stakeholder three and four. The definitions are 
provided in Table 6. 
12 Annual inflation rates were accessed at: www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/south-africa/historic-
inflation/cpi-inflation-south-africa.aspx. The rates used for these calculations are presented in section 
A2 of the Appendix. 
 
Defined Class: Annual Household Income Year of study 
1 2 3 4 
Very Poor R 0 R 150 000 Grant Grant Grant Grant 
Poor R 150 001 R 300 000 Grant Grant Grant\Loan Loan 
Lower Missing Middle R 350 001 R 450 000 Grant Grant\Loan Loan Loan 
Upper Missing Middle R 450 001 R 600 000 Grant\Loan Loan Loan Loan 
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Table 5: 2011 adjusted ISFAP funding categories 
Defined class: Annual Household Income 
Very Poor R 0 R 120 241 
Poor R 120 242 R240 483 
Lower Missing Middle R 240 484 R 360 724 
Upper Missing Middle R 360 725 R 480 965 
Rich R 480 966 and over  
 
In order to match the inflation adjusted class definitions in Table 5 with the predefined annual income 
categories from Census 2011, mid-points were used where categories overlapped to best approximate 
the distributions. The result of these calculations is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: A comparative distribution of household income 
 Annual Household Income Distribution 
Defined Class: 
All 
Households 
Cumulative 
Households with 
Student/s in HE 
Cumulative 
Very Poor 79% 79% 51% 51% 
Poor 9% 88% 15% 66% 
Lower Missing Middle 5% 93% 12% 78% 
Upper Missing Middle 1% 95% 4% 82% 
Rich 5% 100% 18% 100% 
 
Table 6 highlights that while only 5% of South African households are considered rich, the same 
households contain 18% of HE students indicating their over-representation, but not ‘domination’ of 
the student cohort. 
• The second point key stakeholders mentioned regarding the regressive nature of free fee HE 
was that the poor would finance the HE of the rich. Figure 2 looks at the PIT and VAT tax 
burden in South Africa across the poorest to richest citizens. The figure clearly shows that the 
majority of the tax burden falls on the richest 20% of the country’s population whether one 
considers PIT or VAT. 
Figure 2: Concentration share of taxation in SA 
 
      Source: (http://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/FeesHET/hearings/set1/day03-NationalTreasury-Presentation.pdf) 
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3.2 Private benefits justify fees 
• There was unanimous agreement that HE provides a mixture of public and private benefits 
and that given the developmental nature of the SA economy the public benefits are vital to 
the countries growth. Despite this, stakeholders agreed that the private benefits students 
derive from HE are significant enough to justify fees, as key stakeholder two stated, “everyone 
should pay something and irrespective of the size some fee should be paid”. 
 
The private benefits of HE would be substantial given the inequality of income and opportunities in 
SA. This point is well illustrated in Table 7 which highlights the difference between the employment 
rate and wages of matriculants and graduates. 
 
Table 7 – The quantified private benefits of HE13  
Annual Income Bands: Matriculants HE Graduates and Postgraduates 
  No. of earners %  No. of earners %  
No income 260 000 7,50% 25 000 3,3% 
R 1 - R 4 800 78 000 2,30% 3 571 0,5% 
R 4 801 - R 9 600 150 000 4,50% 4 180 0,6% 
R 9 601 - R 19 200 450 000 13,30% 9 529 1,3% 
R 19 201 - R 38 400 770 000 22,50% 21 000 2,8% 
R 38 401 - R 76 800 700 000 20,70% 51 000 6,8% 
R 76 801 - R 153 600 570 000 16,70% 150 000 19,8% 
R 153 601 - R 307 200 300 000 8,80% 230 000 31,2% 
R 307 201 - R 614 400 91 000 2,70% 150 000 20,4% 
R 614 401- R 1 228 800 21 000 0,60% 71 000 9,4% 
R 1 228 801 - R 2 457 600 8 372 0,30% 19 000 2,5% 
R2 457 601 or more 5 796 0,20% 12 000 1,6% 
          
Total number in population: 3 404 168 746 280 
Average earnings per year: R 89 04214 R 385 049 
Employment rate 52% 87% 
 
3.3 NSFAS and affordability concerns: 
 
• All key stakeholders expressed concern over the state’s ability to afford greater allocations to 
HE, particularly given the higher than CPI, inflation rate experienced by the sector. In 
contradiction to the previous finding, key stakeholders also expressed concerns over the 
ability of the average South Africans to afford tuition fees. The belief was held that, due to 
these concerns and in order to create greater equality if access to HE, the income contingent 
loan system was the best way forward.  
                                                          
13 Authors calculations using Census 2011 data, see section 2 
14 With the average matriculant earning R 89 042 per annum they would be exempt from paying personal 
income tax. The tax exempt amount for the year 2011 was R120 000 per annum as per the SARS taxation 
guide: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/guides/Budget%20Pocket%20Guide%2020
11.pdf. 
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Figure 3 shows the dramatic decline state funding to the HE sector between 2000 and 2014. More 
importantly, given the context of this research, it also shows the increase in tuition fees offsetting the 
decline in state funds.  
Figure 3:  Composition Higher Education income streams (2000 and 2014) 
 
          Source: Authors calculations using figures obtained at http://chet.org.za/data/sahe-open-data 
 
• Having expressed the view that free fee HE is regressive, key stakeholders agreed that tuition 
fees must be paid, no matter how small the amount. The ‘social class’ breakdown found in the 
NSFAS and ISFAP funding models were deemed to be sufficient for the purposes of 
determining the amount of tuition fees which need to be paid. 
 
• All key stakeholders acknowledged the financial constraints of South Africans and although 
agreeing that the countries debt situation is precarious, that income contingent loans [NSFAS] 
remained the best way to provide equal access for ‘all’. Key stakeholders all pointed out that 
the system has had several flaws but firmly believed NSFAS to be the best vehicle for creating 
greater access to HE in SA. 
The affordability constraints facing South Africans wishing to attend HE have worsened considerably 
since 2003. At 2015 prices a poor household would need to quadruple its annual income in order to 
facilitate a single year of the costs associated with HE. 
Figure 4 - Full cost of studies and household income by quintile (2003 and 2015) 
 
 
           Source: GTAC, 2016, p.1 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2014
2000
38%
49%
33%
24%
28%
27%
Government funds Tuition Fees Private income
309%
134%
80%
39%
11%
423%
183%
110%
53%
15%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
450%
1 - Poorest 20% 2 3 4 5 - Richest 20%
2003 2015
27 
 
• There was a lack of consultation with literature when framing and discussing policy narratives. 
Two key stakeholders referred to a long term study by (van Broekhuizen, van der Berg, and 
Hofmeyr, 2016) in support of their view, while another stakeholder mentioned extensive 
consultation with the work of Barr and Chapman. 
 
Having presented the key findings, the next section discusses them in greater detail, utilising greater 
detail for the interviews conducted and the data analysis. 
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SECTION 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The policy narrative key stakeholders and commentators hold, which views free fee HE as regressive 
is informed by the class dynamics of the student cohort and the distribution of the tax burden in the 
country. The continued reliance on NSFAS comes as a result of the view that free fee HE is regressive 
and the belief that tuition fees are validated by the private benefits graduates receive.  
4.1 The social dynamics of SA 
The 1997 White paper on HE set the tone for the inadmissibility of free fee HE in SA. As the extract in 
section 1.7 pointed out, free fee HE would not be permissible because of the class dynamics of the 
student cohort. At the time, given the backdrop of Apartheid and the racial segregation described, it 
may well have been the case that the HE student cohort was disproportionately skewed toward 
wealthier social classes while also suffering from racial bias. Much has changed in SA in the proceeding 
20 years, the student cohort now more closely reflects the racial profile of the country while also 
containing a large proportion of female students (De Villiers, 2010). Despite these developments, all 
key stakeholders believed that the thinking behind the denial of free fee HE in the 1997 White Paper 
still stands today, with rich households dominating the student cohort. 
It is important to point out that the definition of both the poor and middle classes remain a 
contentious issue in SA, there is no clearly defined or universally accepted definition for each of the 
said classes (DHET, 2012 and Visagie & Posel, 2013). Despite this, there was agreement on the classes 
used by NSFAS and now ISFAP.  
Table 6 shows the distribution of national annual household income vis-à-vis households with students 
in HE. The analysis of Lehohla (2017)15 had similar findings with rich households comprising only 20.7% 
of the student cohort (at 2016 prices) suggesting that the rich, although over-represented do not 
dominate the student cohort. 
At the other end of the wealth spectrum, 79% of all households in the country would be considered, 
using the adjusted inflation ISFAP model scale detailed in the previous section, to be very poor. 51% 
of households containing students are considered very poor. Despite the under-representation of very 
poor households with students relative to their national distribution, the fact that half of all 
households with students are considered very poor is alarming in its own right. When considering the 
ISFAP sliding scale (Table 4), the implication of this is that half of all households with students would 
                                                          
15 The findings of Lehohla (2017) were personally provided by Key stakeholder six. The findings have not made 
been made publically available as yet. Curiously though, the other presentations made by Lehohla on the same 
day (23 January 2017) as that being referenced, have been made available at: 
http://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/FeesHET/hearings.html 
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require government grants to finance their HE, in other words free fee HE. Taken further, two-thirds 
of all households containing students are classified as poor to very poor, again dispelling the narrative 
that HE is dominated by the rich. This analysis reinforces the need to correctly identify and assess the 
nature of the student cohort particularly given the sensitivity of debates surrounding HE in South 
Africa at present. Tilak (2004, p.18) sates a similar conclusion when assessing the HE student cohort 
in India, “HE is no more elitist; it is somewhat 'democratised' with a large proportion of socioeconomic 
weaker sections participating in HE”. 
Based on the discussion above financial assistance would be accessible to 82% of the households with 
students (via ISFAP), which is an overwhelming majority. While it is evident that as household income 
increases the degree to which households are represented within the student cohort also increases, 
only 18% of the households are deemed financially able to pay tuition fees without assistance from 
ISFAP. The crisis of HE affordability and inequality highlighted by the Government’s Technical Advisory 
Centre16 (GTAC, 2016) in Figure 4 is thus clearly evident. 
In essence then free fee HE is considered regressive and inadmissible because 20.7% (at current prices) 
of all the households containing students are considered rich (earning above R600 000 per annum). 
However, If a household earns R599 000 per annum it is considered part of the missing middle where 
the affordability of HE becomes a concern. It is difficult to see, how an additional R1000 per annum 
would make the difference in being deemed able to afford HE without assistance from the financial 
aid scheme. This is the challenge in relying solely on income data to construct social classes, 
emphasising the need to consider the concerns mentioned by key stakeholder two. Using the figures 
calculated by Lehohla (2017), if the very poor class is expanded to R0 to R300 000 per annum as 
suggested by key stakeholder two, the ISFAP model would provide free HE to 57.5% of the student 
cohort. 
Having shown that the notion that the rich dominate the student cohort, is unfounded, the second 
component of the advantages of the rich have over the poor is now discussed. 
Key stakeholders referred to the fact that they have not seen literature providing evidence in favour 
of free fee HE. Of the key stakeholders who were asked about several of the studies used in this paper, 
all stated that they had not come across them or that the topics of discussion had not been raised. 
Only key stakeholder two failed to mention the study conducted by van Broekhuizen, van der Berg 
and Hofmeyr (2016) as discussed previously. Key stakeholders suggested that this study provides ‘hard 
                                                          
16  The Government Technical Advisory Centre, forms part of the National Treasury. As per the official website 
it provides support in various areas such as public finance management, professional advisory as well as 
project management and transaction support, more information is available at: https://www.gtac.org.za 
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numbers’ which demonstrates that the HE cohort is comprised of students from upper-class secondary 
schools. The study also found that over a third of learners who pass grade 12 with the requirements 
to enter university did not do so (within six years of completing grade 12, during which the study was 
conducted). The reasons for this are not given within the study, however, key stakeholder four, five 
and six stated that this would be caused by the lack of space in universities, learners taking gap years 
and “mostly the big delay occurs because they are trying to find funding”. If the main reasons for 
learners not entering HE directly after matriculation is the inability to finance further studies, the idea 
that ‘the wealthy’ dominate the HE student cohort would be self-fulfilling as they are more likely to 
have the resources to do so. 
Key stakeholder four, five and six used the hypothetical example of a learner who resides in a rich 
household and attends an expensive private school vis-à-vis a learner from a poor household who 
attends a rural secondary school. “When attending HE the student from the private secondary school 
can afford to pay tuition fees and therefore must pay, while the student from the rural school must 
be financially assisted”. Although logical this argument is not irrefutable, whether HE is free or imposes 
substantial fees, students from the rich households will still attend, or at least in the model by 
Psacharopolous (1977), discussed in section 1.5, consider their best alternative given the resources 
and socio-economic conditions at their disposal. Students from poor households would more easily 
be able to access HE if it was free otherwise they must seek financial assistance. Those from poor 
households also lack the resources and socio-economic foundations to consider an equal or greater 
investment as that provided by attending HE. In the absence of funding they must enter the labour 
market as non-graduates and as shown in Table 7 the employment rates and income earned would be 
much lower than that of their graduate counterparts. This results in society and education being 
reproduced, perpetuated by the financial barriers of HE. 
Consider that, as suggested by key stakeholders four, five and six, the above argument is inconclusive 
because if HE was free academic considerations become the sole criteria for HE selection and the rich 
are more likely to succeed as they have access to greater resources. They will, therefore, dominate 
the HE student cohort, a view which again mirrors the findings of Psacharopolous (1977). The issue 
herein is that whether HE is free or imposes substantial tuition fees, the rich will still have access to 
these resources and be best placed to decide on whether to attend HE. Due to the resource 
advantages of the rich, the consequences of a decision not to attend HE would have a far greater 
impact on a poor person as opposed to a rich person. 
Using Figure 4, it is shown that the burden of the full cost of the study for HE is 408% lighter on the 
richest 20% of households than it is on the poorest 20%. The burden is also 38% higher for the second 
31 
 
richest 20% than it is on the richest 20% of households. The rich are therefore more easily able to 
consider the decision to attend HE irrespective of the financial considerations attached to it. By 
introducing free fee HE one of the fundamental barriers which, as shown in Figure 4, effects 80% of 
households in SA, would be removed. Ironically, the study (van Broekhuizen, van der Berg & Hofmeyr, 
2016) mentioned by key stakeholders as providing evidence of the over-representation of the rich in 
HE, also provides evidence of the argument presented herein as pointed out, ironically, by key 
stakeholder 4. Most of the people who do not enter HE immediately after secondary school, despite 
qualifying for entry, do not do so because of financial constraints. The idea that free fee HE is 
regressive because the rich ‘dominate’ the HE student cohort is self-fulfilling as they would have the 
financial means to do so. The findings discussed in this section also suggest that the rich do not 
dominate the student cohort. 
The next section assesses the second component of the argument stating free fee HE is regressive, 
which is that the poor would be financing the HE of the rich. 
4.2 Someone has to pay 
Key stakeholder four and five echoed the narrative of Psacharopolous, analysed in section 1.5. They 
argued that poorer families would fund the HE system which is dominated by the “upper middle class 
and the rich”, a questionable statement given the findings discussed in the previous section. It is 
important to note that even though termed free fee HE, the funds necessary to maintain the HE 
system still need to be sourced, in other words someone has to pay.  
To justify the view expressed above key stakeholder four stated that there is a “nuanced” difference 
between the public and private benefits, using the hypothetical example of the distinction present 
between a lawyer and a social worker the following scenario was presented, “If HE is fully funded by 
the state, a well-to-do lawyer will earn a high salary through their profession, accumulating private 
benefits. While the social worker will provide a greater benefit to society through the work they do, 
he/she will not earn as much income as the lawyer. The lawyer should then personally fund part of 
their HE”. This hypothetical example does not consider the tax implications for the lawyer and the 
social worker. SA utilises a PPIT system, that is, the more an individual earns the greater the amount 
of tax they pay. Therefore even though the lawyer may, potentially, earn a much greater income he 
or she would still contribute much more, through a PPIT system, to society. The second stream of 
taxation, value added tax (VAT) is based on consumption, the greater an individual’s consumption the 
greater the amount of VAT an individual will pay. If free fee HE was to be funded by PIT, the scenario 
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described is unlikely as shown in Figure 2, which was presented by the National Treasury at the 
commission of inquiry into HE and training17.  
Income tax is paid by very few in SA, the richest 20% of the population contribute 97.5% of the total 
PIT collected. They also contribute over two thirds of the VAT collected.  If free fee HE was to be funded 
by the PPIT, it would not be possible for the poor to fund the HE of the rich as the poorest 3 quintiles 
of the population, in other words, 60% of South Africans, do not contribute to this form taxation. In 
keeping with the sentiment of key stakeholder one, who believed that the state budget is a “political 
tool”, Vaizey (1962, p. 36) found that “the opposition to a publicly financed system is a political 
opposition to paying taxes rather than an attitude ineluctably derived from the mainstream of 
economic reasoning”.  Looking at Table 4, it can also be noted that the average matriculant’s income 
per annum excludes them from paying PIT, therefore they would not be contributing to the HE of the 
rich. In this scenario they would in fact not be contributing to society. If free fee HE is provided, the 
matriculants who do pay tax may then consider entering HE due to the removal of the financial barriers 
imposed by fees. 
Vandenberghe (2005) found, using Belgian data, that there was merit to the claim that free fee HE 
was more an ‘implicit loan’ than a regressive transfer, especially among undergraduates. Sturn and 
Wohlfahrt (2000) arrive at the same conclusion using Austrian data. This is the idea behind the PPIT 
system, the more one earns the greater the subsequent contribution to the income tax pool. Taken 
further, a higher income will also lead to an increased consumption of goods and services which would 
then contribute increasing amounts to VAT pool as well.  
The argument that free fee HE is regressive based on the demographics of the student cohort and the 
distribution of taxation have both been shown to be questionable using the findings of this research 
and that of state institutions. The next section focuses on tuition fees which, logically, are an outcome 
of the denial of free fee HE. 
4.3 Tuition Fees: a process of natural financial selection 
One of the fundamental debates, occurring on a global scale, in the HE sector is the issue of rapidly 
rising tuition fees. Tuition fees are ‘justified’ because HE graduates earn higher salaries allowing them 
to enjoy a higher standard of living, which is why the costs of HE should be shared and not fully 
subsidised by the state.  
                                                          
17 The presentation was accessed at: http://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/FeesHET/hearings/set1/day03-
NationalTreasury-Presentation.pdf 
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Key stakeholder four mentioned the fact that the fundamental principles on which the tuition system 
is based are now, due to the protests, open to contestation. However, the point of view one develops 
is facilitated by the research consulted. A point highlighted by key stakeholders one and two who 
mentioned consulting research demonstrating the prominence of private benefits. This conclusion is 
self-fulfilling, especially in SA. It makes logical sense that a HE qualification creates substantial private 
benefits given the conditions facing the youth in the country. Table 7 demonstrates that, as opposed 
to matriculants, graduates enjoy far higher employment rates and subsequent compensation for their 
employment. The private benefits ‘attributed to HE’ are clear to see, however, these figures point to 
a contradiction in the logic behind the critique of free fee HE. If free fee HE is not desirable because it 
is regressive then by accepting the notion put forward by key stakeholders and commentators that 
the rich and upper middle class ‘dominate’ the student cohort it would be logical to conclude that the 
income they would earn post education is much higher than a matriculant from a poorer household. 
In that sense the inequality of income and, therefore, access to HE is perpetuated by the presence of 
high tuition fees. Instead, the lure of employment possibilities and the potential to earning higher 
income creates a willingness by students to pay ever higher tuition fees, in many cases taking on debt, 
in order realise these benefits (Tilak, 2004). 
Although key stakeholders agreed that HE is both a public and private good, acknowledgment was 
given to the fact that the public benefits derived from HE are pivotal in SA, given the country’s 
“transformation agenda and the severe inequality experienced” (key stakeholder two and three). By 
imposing fees, which have been consistently increasing, at approximately two percent higher than 
CPI18, financial barriers to HE are erected. These fee increases put pressure on the ability of households 
to fund further studies. Thus, fees create a process of natural financial selection whereby only those 
who can access funds are catered for. The easier the degree to which these funds are accessible the 
more likely a learner will be able to further their education. The price elasticity of HE for rich 
households would be much lower than the classes below them because of their ability to cope with 
rising tuition costs. Studies in other countries have shown that the poor are more debt averse, thus 
fee increases are likely to adversely impact their ability to access HE (Manski & Wise, 1983; Gladieux 
& Hauptman, 1995 and Callender & Jackson, 2010).  
Callender and Jackson (2010) highlight this point by concluding that, in the United Kingdom, students 
from lower social classes are more debt averse and are therefore are less likely to apply for financial 
assistance in order to access HE. By continually increasing tuition fees, it is the classes below the rich 
                                                          
18 See http://www.usaf.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/HEPI-project-report-Executive-summary.pdf for a 
discussion on the Higher Education Price Inflation calculations and trends. 
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who must seek increasing levels of financial assistance, in other words debt, to access HE. This point 
is evident in Figure 4, where the Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC, 2016), found that the 
full cost studies of HE in 2015, as previously mentioned was greater than the annual household income 
of 60% SA households. The figure also demonstrates the dramatic rise of the full cost of studies over 
the 12 year period of analysis, escalating quicker than the rise in household income. In 2003 the full 
cost of studies was just over three times greater than the annual household income of the poorest 
20% of households in SA. By 2015 this worsened to over four times greater than their annual 
household income. This serves to highlight income inequality present in the country, with the richest 
households 408% more capable of financing the 2015 full cost of study than the poorest households. 
The fourth quintile of households, in other words the second richest 20% of all households, would still 
need to spend over half of their entire annual household annual income in order to meet these 
obligations, for each student in the household. Only the richest 20% of the population are able then, 
relatively speaking, to afford HE.  
The increasing unaffordability of HE also put pressure on the state to provide a greater degree of funds 
to the NSFAS system to ensure that there is adequate financing for each year’s students who simply 
do not have the means with which to finance their studies. In this scenario, only the very poor who 
receive the full cost of study grants and those from rich households whose education is either paid for 
through familial wealth or commercial loans are afforded access to the HE system. The issue herein is 
that it is not only the very poor but, as suggested by Figure 4, 80% of all households in SA which require 
financial assistance for HE. This was one of the primary reasons driving the student protests. The 
funding system for HE is thus a reflection of much broader social conditions within the country, which 
is the point key stakeholder two thought should warrant the increase of the very poor income band 
as previously mentioned. The affordability concerns expressed are a reflection of the lack of financial 
resources not only within South African households but within the state, to which the focus now turns. 
 
4.4 The growth of neoliberalism and the decline of HE funding 
The second component to the introduction and increase of fees, which may then warrant the 
justification for their existence, has been the rise of neoliberalism which involves the marketisation 
and financialisation of economies, the net result of which is a reduction in state spending (Fine, 2012). 
SA retains a strict balanced budget approach. It has been shown that even in a developed country, the 
United States of America, HE budget allocations are the most volatile item in the country’s budget, 
often used as a ‘balancing wheel’ increasing during times of prosperity and the first to be decreased 
during economic downturns (Delaney and Doyle, 2011).  
35 
 
In SA, there has been what is termed ‘chronic underfunding’ of the HE system (DHET, 2014). A process 
which, as detailed in section 1.7, has continued for decades. This has been supplemented by the 
systematic rise in tuition fees as a key component in funding the HE system shown in Figure 3. 
Although the theoretical reasons for fees have been discussed, one must consider the broader 
macroeconomic policy trends which have led to the shrinking of public budgets and the introduction 
of user fees (Fine, 2012). Key stakeholder two, although aware of the state wastages, was critical of 
the continual ‘tightening of the belt’ to satisfy budget cuts, stating that such curtailing is becoming 
“inhumane”. 
One key stakeholder criticised the financial situation in SA, expressing that economy would survive 
with greater state spending, provided the ‘leakages to the state’s financial pot’ are rectified, 
We do over-emphasise this [a balanced budget approach]…how much more proof is required 
to show that the current mode of operations is not working. We are a bit more conservative 
but the combination of low growth and high unemployment is not changing it is as though we 
are waiting for this phase to pass when, indeed, it has not. 
Of the key stakeholders who were shown Table 8, there was mutual agreement that HE in SA 
demonstrates the characteristics of the ‘merchant model’. Tilak (2004, p.18) observed that the market 
does not ensure the ‘socially-optimum’ supply of education, thus in allowing HE to progress toward 
the ‘merchant model’ where the socially desirable level of investment is not met and HE becomes an 
increasingly private, labour-market driven good.  
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Table 8 - The changing nature of HE 
            Source: Vinokur, 2007 
If HE is market driven then it would obviously secure graduates substantial ‘private’ benefits, the 
evidence of which is demonstrated by Table 7. With the global resistance to tuition fees growing, using 
the lure of these private benefits to secure the willingness of students to pay fees obscures the fact 
that governments are not investing the socially optimum amount in HE.  
The next section discusses the financial contribution of the state to the HE system and assesses the 
states HE participation goal based on the funding patterns. 
4.5 Shifting the financial burden of HE 
The states response to the student protests in 2015 was to freeze fee increases for the 2016 academic 
year, followed by the application of fee increases only to those above the ISFAP funding threshold 
(R600 000 household income per annum) in 2017. This freezing of fee increases contradicted a trend 
shown in Figure 3, whereby since 2000 there had been a steady decline in the contribution of state 
funding to the HE system, which was complemented by a rise in student fees to make up for this 
shortfall. 
In 14 years, the contribution of the state to HE income fell by over 10% while the contribution of 
tuition fees rose by over 10%.  Key stakeholder two was well aware of this situation stating that “the 
problem started a long time ago. This is not to shift the blame onto the National Treasury, the problem 
is that there isn’t enough in the state coffers. The only way to generate funds was to increase student 
fees”. Taken further key stakeholder one and two also mentioned the fact that the DHET had been 
aware of the impending crisis which the system now finds itself in. As a result, the DHET submitted 
several bids to increase the national budget allocation to HE and training but the government simply 
 Socialised model Merchant model 
Nature of education Public good Private good 
Merchant service? Non-merchant service Merchant service 
Profit-making? Non-profit-making Profit and non-profit-making 
Price or rate Free or almost free Charged 
Supply Determined on the ground of 
economic or social need 
Market driven 
Selection Academic Academic and/or pecuniary 
Financing Public Private 
Cost of living charge ability Wage/grant/autonomy 
allowance 
By the family or by debt 
Access to employment Positions administered, 
national salary scales (aiming 
to equality) 
Labour Market 
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‘did not’ have the funds to fulfil these additional increases. The same stakeholders also spoke of a 
‘hierarchy’ of needs, through which the budget is prioritised, a process whereby the cabinet decides 
on national spending priorities after which the national budget is allocated accordingly. These 
developments effectively demonstrate the fiscal austerity synonymous with neoliberalism and the 
reduction of social spending that has resulted (Fine, 2012). Tilak (2004, p.10) warns against this 
thinking, “patterns of public expenditures in developing countries show that the governments are not 
as much starved of resources as of a lack of priorities and political will, especially in the case of sectors 
like education”. 
Looking at the ten-year trend in funding shown in Figure 3, HE does not appear to be a priority in light 
of the ‘limited state funds’ available. A point which was clearly expressed by one of the key 
stakeholders, stating that “when the public budget is seriously strained and tough decisions have to 
be made HE has never been a top priority, until recently. Spending usually focuses on pro-poor areas 
like basic education, health and other growth-enhancing activities. HE has never been there, it has 
only been put there because we have reached a crisis”.  
With the SA economy faltering it can be argued that the ‘growth-enhancing activities’ which were 
prioritised have borne little fruit, sentiment was echoed, as mentioned earlier, by key stakeholder 
one. In light of the state’s budget pressures, it appears that the government was aware of the 
underfunding of the HE system, reducing its contribution and increasing that of tuition fees. This 
swapping of financial burdens inevitably reached a melting point, as indicated by key stakeholder two, 
“students are now feeling the pain and are therefore protesting, otherwise it could have been business 
as usual for a long time”. The sustained reliance on increasing tuition fees further highlights the 
decision to freeze fee increases for the 2016 academic year. All key stakeholders were averse to this 
decision demonstrating the heavy reliance on tuition fees.  
They believe that the decision had negative consequences for the sector, firstly it set a “bad” 
precedent of non-fee increases upon which it would be difficult to retract in future and secondly, the 
decision lost the HE sector a substantial amount of income as expressed by key stakeholders two, “we 
have lost a lot of income, particularly from sponsors. I heard that the Chamber of Mines supports 6000 
students, by freezing fee increases the additional funds which would have come through from this 
source did not. So for each student there is a loss of income”.  The reliance on other avenues of income 
is further evidence of a ‘merchant model’ of HE, as discussed in section 1.1 and 1.2 
The decision to freeze fee increases also meant that a funding strategy for the poor and missing middle 
would need to be found. Key stakeholder one stated that this would “require a significant increase in 
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funding, however, the state cannot carry this cost which is why ISFAP proposes a public private 
partnership (PPP), a solution which would get the private sector to contribute”.  
The criticism leveled by key stakeholders around the freezing of fee increases reflect the over-reliance 
on tuition fees in funding HE. Key stakeholder three was defensive of this stating that “fee increments 
are a natural outcome of increasing costs at universities ... and for the country as a whole so 
universities will be affected and will need to pass these increased costs on to the students”. As 
mentioned, Lehohla (2017) showed that only a fifth of all households containing HE students are 
classified as rich (earning above R600 000 per annum). If we accept that, as proposed by the ISFAP 
model, any household in the country that earns below R600 000 per annum forms part of the poor 
and missing middle, we are accepting that 80% of households in SA require financial assistance. 
The next section looks HE participation goals the state has set for HE, which are assessed given the 
funding constraints discussed above. 
4.5.1 Expanding access without funds 
The NDP sets ambitious goals of significantly increasing the HE participation rate as well as the capacity 
of universities in order to facilitate this, by the year 2030. It is difficult to envision these targets being 
met based on the discussion in the previous section. Key stakeholder one pointed this out, “the White 
Paper issued in 2013, much of which emanated from the NDP, was issued without a resource plan. It 
proposed an idealised picture of what SA should look like without any roadmap toward achieving 
these ideals”. Key stakeholder two believed “the faults in this strategy are clearly starting to 
materialise”. 
Key stakeholder one felt that, “If we do not increase the [state] funding, the 30% participation rate 
the national planning commission has set, is not going to happen. Yet if they say 30% we have to 
commit, it is good to set high targets but one needs to put down pathways to this. Will we get there 
with current resources? I don’t think so”.  The planning commission thus set over-ambitious targets 
without the necessary resource provisions for these targets to be met.   
Looking at the class distribution in Table 6, the NDPs participation rate goal of 30% would mean a large 
number of those currently financially excluded from HE, would be able gain access to HE given 
composition of wealth within the country. Given the funding concerns discussed the funds necessary 
to allow this would not come from the state but through loans. It is for this reason that key 
stakeholders and commentators would naturally insist that NSFAS is the correct vehicle with which to 
increase access to HE.  
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The focus now turns to the income contingent loan system by assessing the current developments in 
the wake of the protests followed by the practicality of the system given the findings herein.  
4.6 Debt for Access 
Key stakeholder one stated that due to the state’s budgetary pressures and the billions of Rands in 
additional spending needed to fund the ‘missing middle’, a new model was developed leveraging off 
the increased involvement of the private sector (ISFAP). The private sector, in this case, referring to 
banks and financial institutions, who are involved in order to bridge the financial gap in the HE system. 
The formation of this PPP falls perfectly in line with Fine’s (2012, p.5) analysis of neoliberal policy, “the 
expansion of markets under neoliberalism (as with all aspects of privatisation and commodification) 
has underpinned the expansion of finance in particular… with financialisation as the key distinguishing 
feature of the neoliberal era… this is not simply a matter of macroeconomic policy but the heavy 
subordination of economic and social policy to the dictates of the promotion of markets in general 
and especially of finance”. Hill (2010) also comments on the commercialisation of education in what 
is termed “edu-business,” the process of privatising education systems turning them into profit 
making institutions, which by 2004 was already generating $365 billion in profit worldwide. 
HE in SA is either paid for by familial wealth, a commercial student loan or NSFAS, the problem herein 
is that the exact size of each of these forms of financing is unknown. Commercial banks and 
educational loan providers do not share their data as highlighted by Donnelly (2012). In keeping with 
this veil of secrecy one of the loan providers, although initially agreeing to provide data for the 
purposes of this research, later declined.  
What also become apparent was the lack of data availability, management and co-ordination within 
NSFAS. The organisation was previously decentralised with micro-offices at each university and no 
system to link all the micro-offices together. Thus obtaining data on the total number of applications 
made, the number of applications declined and the annual household income of the applicants proved 
to be an ultimately ‘impossible’ task. When this query was presented to those involved with the Higher 
Education Management Information System (HEMIS), an over-arching data system which contains the 
data of every student in the HE system, the response was similar, stating that NSFAS data is very 
difficult to access and at that moment was not available. It was suggested that the official report on 
NSFAS, which would contain the requested data, would be released in 2017 (after the completion of 
this research paper).  
While these complications created difficulty in assessing the financial composition of the student 
cohort for the purposes of this study, the same challenges would be encountered by those assessing 
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and compiling policy. Without the necessary data, one must question the basis of claims made 
regarding the nature of HE. Key stakeholder six mentioned that no study or data collection effort has 
been successful in determining the relative size of each financing source. If these details, crucial to the 
topic of this research, are unknown can the claim truly be made that free fee HE would be regressive? 
Commercial banks and other educational loan institutions have thrown a veil of secrecy around the 
number of students they provide finances for. With the ISFAP model, the same institutions will be 
responsible for providing the funds necessary to financially assist the ‘missing middle’. The point of 
contention here is that the private sector already provides loans for HE, like all other loans they 
provide, with the intention of making a profit. It is worth questioning whether the missing middle’s 
inability to afford HE has been seen as a profit making exercise. Key stakeholder one echoed these 
concerns regarding the involvement of the private sector in the financing of HE, “the private sector is 
really coming to the party, I ask what’s in it for them. It may be a good idea to really interrogate that 
model [ISFAP]. The banks are part of the model yet they already fund quite a few students”. 
Profit making concerns aside, the second point of contention with the PPP relates to the students to 
which these loans will be granted. Key stakeholder one stated that “there is the danger of this 
becoming an elitist funding scheme for those who qualify for the highly rated qualifications, for 
example, medical students because not everyone qualifies for those courses”. Key stakeholder two 
also mentioned that with the increase in private funding, “the private sector may influence HE 
institutions into doing the things they want them to do”.  
One must ask the question whether, in the face of private sector funding, an engineering applicant 
will be preferred over a fine arts applicant given the perceived employability of those graduates and 
their resultant potential to repay those loans, especially given the narrative of HE as a labour-market 
driven good. The future of HE funding and policy will be interesting to monitor once the ISFAP model 
is fully implemented and whether or not the private sector is regulated. Neoliberalism has succeeded 
in creating negative connotations of state involvement in the economy (Chang, 2003), however, the 
2008 global financial crisis and more recently, and closer to home, the exchange rate fixing scandal by 
financial institutions (Steyn, 2017) demonstrates the dangers of unmitigated financialisation and 
excessive privatisation.  
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4.7 Expanding loans in an affordability crisis 
Summarising the argument thus far, it has been demonstrated that key stakeholders are adamant 
that, as a result of the private benefits obtained through HE, fees are necessary. Utilising a policy 
doctrine not dissimilar to that discussed in section 1, the country has been relying on ever increasing 
tuition fees for decades. Despite the severe affordability constraints detailed in section 4.2, key 
stakeholders were unanimous in the belief that income contingent loans (ICL) were a good solution. 
While key stakeholders believed that improvements could be made in the efficiency of the system, it 
was still viewed as ‘fair’ with the belief that the greater earning potential of HE graduates would 
outweigh the debt created by the student loan. Key stakeholder two and four believed that this is a 
fair trade off, with the former stating that to some extent, tuition fees should be paid, the amount be 
determined through NSFAS, “even if it is R200 a month, it must be paid”.  
The decision to continue with ICLs in order to improve access comes amidst a serious debt problem in 
the country, something all stakeholders were well aware of. “The reason why South Africans are so in 
debt is because they take out so many loans at stores for commodity goods, which they can never pay 
off” (Key stakeholder two). The contribution of Finn (2015) to the minimum wage research along with 
the Figure 1 demonstrate the precariousness of the financial realities of most households in SA. Loans 
are taken out by the poor because they have very limited means with which to fund their purchases. 
There are also large financial pressures on previously disadvantaged graduates to cater for their 
extended families. Despite these additional concerns all stakeholders believed that beyond the 
minimum income threshold, loans should still be administered and re-paid. “The ICL system is not 
issued at commercial rates and it depends largely on the income of graduates thus I don’t believe it 
will worsen the debt crisis. If you have succeeded in HE there is a good chance of finding employment 
and based on the income you earn you repay the loan on favourable terms and that is reasonable, I 
can’t see that escalating indebtedness ” (Key stakeholder four).  
Having discussed the financial constraints of the state and the ‘chronic underfunding’ of the system, 
it was surprising that the costs of administration for the new ISFAP system were not mentioned. That 
being said, key stakeholder three and four mentioned that means testing applicants to determine their 
household income was “costly and cumbersome”.   
When assessing the theoretical foundations of HE, in light of the rise of neoliberal macroeconomic 
policies, a clear shift is seen in the sources of HE funding. The dramatic drop in state funding has been 
accompanied by an increased reliance on tuition fees in order to provide the necessary funds for the 
HE system. Therefore, in continuing along the current HE and macroeconomic policy framework, fees 
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and the ICL system are vital components in the future of HE funding. Even though there are severe 
affordability issues in SA, the HE system would simply not be able to function without the income 
generated by tuition fees, this dependency is not theoretically well founded serving instead to 
highlight the dominance of financialisation, privatisation and the reduced social spending of states 
(Fine, 2012).  
This process is not unique to SA, but has been shown by Tilak (2004) to be a global phenomenon. As 
fees continue to increase, financial barriers to HE are erected and therefore there is an increased 
reliance on ICLs to create greater access to HE. The entire stream of income generated by tuition fees 
theoretically rests on the ‘private benefits’ generated by HE, using the possibility of employment 
opportunities and higher income to lure students into paying higher tuition fees. In essence then, the 
reliance on tuition fees and the ICL system boils down to the fact that someone has to fund the HE 
system and it has been shown that this burden has been increasingly shifting from the state to 
students, firstly through fiscal austerity and secondly through the hierarchical spending discussed 
earlier. 
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SECTION 5 – CONCLUSION 
5.1 Free Fee higher education, the 20-80 rule 
The current HE crisis and the attention which it has attracted have highlighted the ‘chronic 
underfunding’ of HE by the state. Of great concern is the fact that various state institutions were aware 
of the impending crisis but were unable to act on their concerns due to the ‘budgetary pressures’ 
facing the state. The funding constraints were merely pushed onto students. It has also been 
highlighted, by key stakeholders in the sector, that had students not voiced their concerns by 
protesting, the status quo of rising tuition fees and reduced government allocations to the HE system 
may well have continued. While key stakeholders understood the funding challenges and the financial 
difficulties faced in SA they remained steadfast in the continuation of tuition fees, unanimously 
agreeing that the decision to freeze fee increases in 2015 was a poor, a clearly contradictory set of 
views. Essentially someone must pay and the state is not going to. 
Ironically, the student protests, have caused the HE system to seek assistance from financial 
institutions to bridge the funding gap. If the state was ‘chronically’ underfunding the system and 
shifting the burden onto students, while aware of the tough economic conditions and lack of 
affordability, the current crisis would seem self-imposed. Further to this, despite public institutions 
releasing findings regarding the affordability and characteristics of the student cohort, the argument 
that free fee HE is regressive remains firmly entrenched despite evidence suggesting this may not be 
accurate. 
There was also no acknowledgment that rapidly rising fees may facilitate the over-representation of 
the rich within the student cohort, especially given the GTAC full cost of study affordability analysis 
presented. If the state is looking to increase the number of poor students in the student cohort, aware 
that the poor cannot afford HE and that there is ‘not enough resources’ available to fund all the 
prospective students who apply to NSFAS, the state is indirectly creating the financial constraints of 
the poor. This would also play a role in manipulating the representation of each social class within the 
HE cohort. 
In comparing the personal income and employment data of matriculants vis-à-vis graduates it is clear 
to see that graduates have a distinctive earning advantage as the policy narrative states. However, the 
precarious position of the youth in SA and the lack of employment and economic growth also serve to 
exaggerate the differences between matriculants and graduates, such that in 2011 the average 
matriculant did not contribute to the PPIT pool. Taken further economic and social conditions in SA 
have resulted in the richest 20% of the working population contributing 97.5% of the country’s PPIT. 
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With this in mind and the fact that only 18% of the households with students being classified as rich 
(at 2011 prices) if fees tuition fees were removed it is difficult to see how the poor would finance the 
HE of the rich, as stated by key stakeholders.  
In summary if only 18% of the households with students are considered rich, only 20% of households 
deemed able to afford HE without financial assistance and only 20% of the working population 
contributing 97.5% of PPIT and 76.6% of the VAT then the argument against free fee higher education 
effectively has strong financial and debt implications for 80% of households with students. The 
questioning the notion that the rich dominate the student cohort. 
The continuation of the ICL system in the face of the heavy indebtedness found within SA. The long 
term implications of this PPP remain to be seen but concerns were certainly highlighted by key 
stakeholders. The justification of fees based on the private benefits of HE provides the theoretical 
foundation for the presence of tuition fees and therefore the continuation of the ICL. This theory is 
self-fulfilling particularly in the case of developing countries where the difference between the income 
earning potential of graduates and non-graduates is sizeable. What is not mentioned is the direction 
of causality between HE and income. Does HE ensure graduates earn a higher income, or as studies in 
sociology have shown, does higher income cause higher levels of educational attainment? The manner 
in which this relationship is assessed would lead to different conclusions, specifically within the severe 
financial constraints of households in SA.  
Although funding policies involve the division of applicants by annual household income a broader 
understanding of the social classes seems to be lacking. Key stakeholders mentioned the financial 
pressures facing South Africans but failed to highlight the broader social context surrounding the 
income classes defined by NSFAS. Key stakeholders made no mention of the fact that HE may be 
influenced by existing income and parental educational attainment, rather the insistence on the fact 
that tuition fees are necessary because HE yields advantages in the labour market allowing for a higher 
income earning potential. 
Despite the fact that several of the figures presented herein have been researched and reported by 
state institutions, there is still a wide-spread belief within various state entities that free fee HE is 
regressive and that fees must be paid, with the state reducing its funding as it has and the financial 
difficulties of SA households, HE faces an affordability crisis and thus the ICL system is by default the 
only vehicle to create access. This reasoning is not mentioned, but rather the lure of employment and 
higher wages is used to entice students to take on debt to study. This paper has demonstrated that 
both the theory and numbers behind the claims that free fee He is regressive are questionable, with 
no findings in support of the notion.  
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5.2 Recommendations for further research 
• To fully understand the nature and dynamics of the student cohort further research is needed 
to lift the veil of the secrecy, created by the private sector, surrounding the funding sources 
of students.  
 
• The annual household income of households containing students also needs to be more 
accurately determined, hence the suggestion by key stakeholders to use the South African 
Revenue Service. 
 
  
• With the centralisation of NSFAS underway, better data management will allow for an 
assessment of who applies to HE and who is denied access based on financial constraints.  
 
• The direction of causality between HE and income needs to be assessed further, particularly 
in the SA context. 
 
• This paper has shown that much of the economics theory pertaining to HE funding and tuition 
fees is questionable given the context of South African HE. The argument and policy narrative 
stating that free fee HE is regressive is theoretically questionable with the evidence presented 
pointing to the contrary. Without the data mentioned, this argument cannot truly dispelled, 
as questionable as it may be.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A.1 Core interview questions 
1. South Africa is often regarded as the most unequal society in the world, necessitating the 
importance of class dynamics when considering policy. How would you define the three 
main income cohorts or classes of South Africa (poor, middle, rich)? What criteria 
would/do you use to define the three classes in constructing policy or analysing policy? 
 
2. The general debate on higher education positions it as a mixture between a public and a 
private good, what are your thoughts on this?  
(Show Table 5) Which model is used in South Africa? 
 
3. Higher education provides both private and social benefits, where private returns consist 
of the potential to earn higher personal income and the social benefits are said to include 
greater efficiency in consumption, better health, increased political efficacy and greater 
access to and understanding of culture, science and technology. Which outcome of higher 
education do you feel outweighs the other and why? 
 
4. The World Bank (2015) rated South Africans as the most indebted consumers in the world, 
would expanding the educational loan system to create more access not increase the 
precariousness of this position? 
 
5. What precedent, do you feel, was set by freezing the fee increase for 2016? 
 
6. Literature from the World Bank, dating as far back as 1977 make the claim that fee free 
or heavily subsidised higher education would amount to a regressive policy. Do you feel 
that fee free higher education for all would amount to a regressive policy? Why or why 
not? 
 
7. “Fee-free higher education for students is not an affordable or sustainable option for 
South Africa. The knowledge and skills acquired in the course of achieving higher 
education qualifications generate significant lifetime private benefits for successful 
students as well as long-range social benefits for the public at large. Although higher 
education institutions admit an increasingly large proportion of students from poor 
families, students from middle-class and wealthy families still tend to be 
disproportionately well-represented. For all these reasons, the costs of higher education 
should be shared equitably between public and private beneficiaries” (Education White 
Paper 3, 1997, p.40). Do you feel this still applies and what would your reasoning, if any 
different to that presented above be? 
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A.2 Annual inflation rates used in section 3.2.2 
 
Annual consumer price inflation rates (2016- 2012) 
 CPI South Africa 2016 7,07 % 
 CPI South Africa 2015 5,18 % 
 CPI South Africa 2014 5,32 % 
 CPI South Africa 2013 5,30 % 
 CPI South Africa 2012 5,71 % 
Source: www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/south-africa/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-south-africa.aspx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
REFERENCE LIST 
 
Archer, S., 2015. Free Higher education pricey. Available at: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/letters/2015/10/20/letter-free-education-pricey. Last accessed: 18 
June 2016. 
Barr, N. (1991). Income–contingent Student Loans: An Idea Whose Time has Come. In Shaw, 
G.K. Economics, Culture and Education: Essays in Honour of Mark Blaug. Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, pp. 155-170. 
Barr, N., 2003. Financing higher education: Comparing the options. London School of Economics and 
Political Sciences, Available at: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/nb/Barr_HE_options030610.pdf, Last 
accessed: 26 September 2016. 
Barr, N., 2004. Higher education funding. Oxford review of economic policy, 20(2): pp.264-283. 
Becker, G.S., 1962. Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. Journal of political 
economy, 70(5, Part 2): pp.9-49. 
Becker, G. S., 1964. Human Capital: A Theory and Empirical Analysis. Cambridge: National Bureau of 
Economic Research 
Branson, N., Garlick, J., Lam, D. and Leibbrandt, M., 2012. Education and Inequality: The South African 
Case (No. 75). Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.  
Bunting, I., 2006. The Higher Education Landscape Under Apartheid, in N., Cloete, P., Maassen, R., 
Fehnel, T., Moja, T., Gibbon, H., Perold. (eds.) Transformation in Higher Education. Norwell: Springer. 
Burger, P., 2015. Wages, Productivity and Labour's Declining Income Share in Post‐Apartheid South 
Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 83(2), pp.159-173. 
Callender, C. and Jackson, J., 2005. Does the fear of debt deter students from higher 
education? Journal of social policy, 34(04), pp.509-540. 
Carlisle, A., 2016. Mabizela – It’s time to reimagine education, Available at: 
http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/opinion/2016/01/30/mabizela-its-time-to-reimagine-education/, Last 
accessed: 11th November 2016. 
Chang, H.J., 2003. Globalization, economic development and the role of the state. London: Zed Books. 
Chapman, B., 1997. Conceptual issues and the Australian experience with income contingent charges 
for higher education. The Economic Journal, 107(442), pp.738-751. 
Chapman, B., 2001. Australian higher education financing: issues for reform. Australian economic 
review, 34(2), pp.195-204. 
Chapman, B. (2005). ‘Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reform’. 
Discussion Paper No. 491. Australian National University, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, http://econrsss.anu.edu.au/pdf/DP491.pdf, Last accessed: 15th February 2016`. 
49 
 
Council on Higher Education., 2016. South African Higher Education Reviewed - Two Decades of 
Democracy, Available at: http://www.che.ac.za/media_and_publications/monitoring-and-
evaluation/south-african-higher-education-reviewed-two-decad-0, Last accessed: 22 September 2016 
Cloete, N., 2016. Free higher education: Another self-destructive South African policy, Available at: 
http://www.chet.org.za/files/Higher%20education%20and%20Self%20destructive%20policies%2030
%20Jan%2016.pdf, Last accessed: 18 June 2016. 
de Rivero, O.B., 2001. The myth of development: the non-viable economies of the 21st Century. 
London: Zed Books. 
Delaney, J.A. and Doyle, W.R., 2011. State spending on higher education: Testing the balance wheel 
over time. Journal of Education Finance, 36(4), pp.343-368. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Klapper, L.F., Singer, D. and Van Oudheusden, P., 2015. The global findex database 
2014: Measuring financial inclusion around the world, Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/187761468179367706/pdf/WPS7255.pdf#page=3, Last 
accessed: 27 February 2017.  
Donnelly, L., 2012. Loans weigh students down, Available at: www.mg.co.za/article/2012-08-31-loans-
weigh-students-down, Last accessed: 26 February 2017. 
Fine, B., 2012. Financialisation and social policy, in P., Utting, S., Razavi and R., Buchholz (eds.) Global 
crisis and transformative social change. London: Routledge 
Fine, B. and Jomo, K.S., 2006. The new development economics: post Washington Consensus 
neoliberal thinking. London: Zed Books. 
Finn, A., 2015. A national minimum wage in the context of the South African labour market, Available 
at: http://saldru.com.uct.ac.za/handle/11090/786, Last accessed: 4 February 2016 
Gladieux, L. and Hauptman, A.M., 1995. The College Aid Quandary: Access. Quality, and the Federal 
Role, Washington: The Brookings Institution. 
Gower, R., Pearce, C. and Raworth, K., 2012. Left Behind by the G20 How inequality and 
environmental degradation threaten to exclude poor people from the benefits of economic growth. 
Oxfam Policy and Practice: Agriculture, Food and Land, 12(1), pp.35-80. 
González, C. and Pedraja, L., 2016. Higher education reasserts its role as a public good, Available at: 
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20160713160953157, Last accessed: 8 
August 2016. 
Government Technical Advisory Centre., 2016. National Students Financial Aid Scheme, Available at: 
https://www.gtac.gov.za/PublicExpenditurePolicy/National%20Student%20Financial%20Aid%20Sche
me%20(NSFAS).pdf, Last accessed: 9 January 2017. 
Herndon, T., Ash, M. and Pollin, R., 2014. Does high public debt consistently stifle economic growth? 
A critique of Reinhart and Rogoff. Cambridge journal of economics, 38(2), pp.257-279. 
Heyneman, S.P., 2003. The history and problems in the making of education policy at the World Bank 
1960–2000. International journal of educational development, 23(3), pp.315-337. 
50 
 
Hill, D., 2010. Class, capital, and education in this neoliberal and neoconservative period. in P., 
McLaren, S., Macrine, and D. Hill, (eds.) Revolutionizing Pedagogy- Education for Social Justice Within 
and Beyond Global Neo-Liberalism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Isaacs, G., 2014. The Myth of ‘Neutrality’ and the Rhetoric of ‘Stability’: Macroeconomic Policy in 
Democratic South Africa. PERSA: Political Economy of Restructuring in South Africa (No. 1). Working 
Paper. 
Johnson, W.R., 2006. Are public subsidies to higher education regressive?. Education, 1(3), pp.288-
315. 
Jongbloed, B., 2006. Strengthening consumer choice in higher education. in P., Teixeira, D. B., 
Johnstone, M. J. Rosa and J.J. Vossensteijn (eds.) Higher Education: A Fairer Deal? Dordrecht: Springer 
Netherlands. 
Kane, T.J., 1995. Rising public college tuition and college entry: How well do public subsidies promote 
access to college? (No. 5164). National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Lam, D., 1999. Generating extreme inequality: Schooling, earnings, and intergenerational transmission 
of human capital in South Africa and Brazil. (Research Report 99-439.) Ann Arbor: Population Studies 
Center, University of Michigan. 
Lehohla, P., 2017. (Forthcoming) Education in South Africa, presented to the Commission of inquiry 
into higher education and training on 23 January, 2017  
Maassen, P. and Cloete, N., 2006. Global reform trends in higher education. in N., Cloete and I. 
Bunting (eds.) Transformation in higher education. Pretoria: Centre for Higher Education 
Transformation. 
Manski, C.F. and Wise, D.A., 1983. College choice in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
McMahon, W., 2009. The Private and Social Benefits’ of Higher Education. Higher Learning, Greater 
Goal. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.  
Merisotis, J., 1998. Who benefits from higher education? An American perspective. International 
higher education, (12) 
Merisotis, J., 1999. A Conceptual Framework: Public and Private Benefits of Higher Education. Paper 
for The Institute for Higher Education Policy, Washington. D.C. 
Mincer, J., 1989. Human Capital and the Labour Market A Review of Current Research. Educational 
Researcher, 18(4), pp.27-34.  
Mishan, E.J., 1969. Some Heretical Thoughts on University Reform. Encounter, 32(3), pp.3-15. 
Moosa, F., 2016. Seven university protests around world resonate with #feesmustfal. Available at: 
http://www.thedailyvox.co.za/seven-university-protests-around-world-resonate-feesmustfall, Last 
accessed: 5 February 2016 
National Student Financial Aid Scheme, 2015. 2014 Annual Report. Available at: 
http://www.nsfas.org.za/content/reports/NSFAS%20AR%202014-15.pdf, Last Accessed: 10 
September 2016 
51 
 
Nicolson, G., 2016. Analysis: Nzimande’s offer to cover the poor tests students’ resolve on free 
education, Available at: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-09-19-analysis-nzimandes-offer-
to-cover-the-poor-tests-students-resolve-on-free-education/#.WCgvgvp95hE, Last accessed: 11 
November 2016 
Orthofer, A., 2016. Wealth inequality–striking new insights from tax data, Available at: 
http://www.econ3x3.org/sites/default/files/articles/Orthofer%202016%20Wealth%20distribution%20
and%20tax%20data%20FINAL.pdf, Last accessed: 3 February 2017 
Painceira, J.P., 2012. Developing countries in the era of financialisation: from deficit accumulation to 
reserve accumulation. Financialisation in crisis, 32, p.185. 
Psacharopoulos, G., 1972. Rates of Return to Investment in Education around the World. Comparative 
Education Review, 16(1), pp.54-67. 
Psacharopoulos, G., 1977. The perverse effects of public subsidization of education or how equitable 
is free education?. Comparative Education Review, 21(1), pp.69-90. 
Psacharopoulos, G., 1981. Returns to education: An updated international comparison. Comparative 
education, 17(3), pp.321-341. 
Psacharopoulos, G., 1994. Returns to investment in education: A global update. World 
development, 22(9), pp.1325-1343. 
Psacharopoulos, G., 2006. The Value of Investment in Education: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. Journal 
of Education Finance, 32(2), pp.113-136. 
Ram, R., 1982. Public subsidization of schooling and inequality of educational access: a new world 
cross-section study. Comparative Education Review, 26(1), pp.36-47. 
Samoff, J. and Carrol, B., 2003, From manpower planning to the knowledge era: World Bank policies 
on higher education in Africa. UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge, Division 
of Higher Education, UNESCO, 8th October 2003. 
Schultz, T.W., 1961. Investment in human capital. The American Economic Review, 51(1), pp.1-17. 
Shange, N. 2015, Free higher education for all impossible – Nzimande, Available at: 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/free-higher-education-for-all-impossible-nzimande-
20151203, Last accessed: 23 July 2016 
Siebrits, F. and Calitz, E., 2007. The legacy and challenge of fiscal policy in sub-Saharan Africa. South 
African Journal of Economics, 75(2), pp.221-235. 
Simkins, C., 2016. Funding. From South African higher education reviewed: two decades of 
democracy, in Kagisano 10, Pretoria: Council on Higher Education 
South African Broadcasting Commission, Thursday 7 April 2016 16:04, Free education for all not 
feasible: Manana, SABC, Available at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_VDDcoxnZA, Last 
accessed: 11 November 2016. 
Sturn, R. and Wohlfahrt, G., 2000. Who Pays for Higher Education? A Note on the Neglected Role of 
Income Tax Progression. FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 57(1), pp.126-136. 
52 
 
Steyn, L., 2017. Rate-rigging traders still at work, Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2017-02-24-00-
rate-rigging-traders-still-at-work, Last accessed: 27 February 2017.f 
Steyn, A.G.W. and De Villiers, A.P., 2007. Public funding of higher education in South Africa by means 
of formulae. Review of Higher Education in South Africa, pp.11-51. Pretoria: Council on Higher 
Education 
Task Force on Higher Education, 2000. Higher education in developing countries: Peril and 
promise (No. 440). World Bank. 
Tilak, J.B., 2004. Higher Education between the State and the Market. Quarterly Review of Education 
(Unesco), 21(2), pp.227-39.  
Trostel, P.A., 2010. The fiscal impacts of college attainment. Research in Higher Education, 51(3), 
pp.220-247. 
Vaizey, J., 1962, The Economics of Education.  London: Farber and Farber. 
van Broekhuizen, H., van der Berg, S. and Hofmeyr, H., 2016. Higher Education Access and Outcomes 
for the 2008 South African National Matric Cohort (No. 10358). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Vandenberghe, V, 2005. Free Higher Education-Regressive Transfer or Implicit Loan? (No. 2005031). 
Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. 
Veselý, A., 2012. Education and the reproduction of inequalities. In D. Erasga (ed.), Sociological 
landscape: Theories, realities, and trends. Rijeka, Croatia: InTech. 
Visagie, J. and Posel, D., 2013. A reconsideration of what and who is middle class in South 
Africa. Development Southern Africa, 30(2), pp.149-167. 
Vinokur, A., 2007. Study Now, Pay Later. Endettement étudiant et restructuration de l'enseignement 
supérieur. HAL.  
Woodhall, M., 2007. Funding higher education: The contribution of economic thinking to debate and 
policy development. World Bank, Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-
1099079956815/Funding_HigherEd_wps8.pdf, last accessed: 22 July 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
Official Policy Documents: 
 
DHET, 2012. Report of the Working Group on Free Fee University Education for the Poor in South 
Africa. Pretoria: Department of Higher Education and Training. Available at: 
http://www.dhet.gov.za/SiteAssets/Fees%20Must%20Fall/287700266-Final-Draft-Report-of-the-
Working-Group-on-Fee-Free.pdf 
DHET, 2013. White Paper for Post-School Education and Training. Building an expanded, effective and 
integrated post-school system. Pretoria: Department of Higher Education and Training. Available at: 
http://www.dhet.gov.za/SiteAssets/Latest%20News/White%20paper%20for%20post-
school%20education%20and%20training.pdf 
DHET, 2014. Report of the Ministerial Committee for the Review of the Funding of Universities. 
Pretoria: Department of Higher Education and Training. Pretoria: Department of Higher Education and 
Training. Available at: 
http://www.dhet.gov.za/Financial%20and%20Physical%20Planning/Report%20of%20the%20Ministeri
al%20Committee%20for%20the%20Review%20of%20the%20Funding%20of%20Universities.pdf 
DHET., 2015. Setting the record straight. Available at: 
http://www.dhet.gov.za/SiteAssets/Latest%20News/November/2015%2011%2007%20Setting%20the
%20Record%20Straight-1.pdf. Last accessed: 18 June 2016. 
DHET., 2016. Report of the Ministerial Task Team to develop a Support and Funding Model for Poor 
and “Missing Middle” students, Available at: 
http://www.dhet.gov.za/SiteAssets/Gazettes/MTT_Report.pdf, Last accessed: 18 February 2017. 
DoE, 1997. Education White Paper 3: A programme for the transformation of Higher 
Education. Pretoria: Department of Education. Available at: 
http://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/publications/White_Paper3.pdf 
National Development Plan, 2011. Available at: 
www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/Documents/devplan_ch9_0.pdf, Last accessed: 23 
September 2016 
 
